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The Importance of Variable Annuities
in a Defined Contribution Pension
System
P Brett Hammond
Variable annuities are an increasingly popular retirement vehicle in the
U.S. A variable annuity is a mechanism by which a person's current sav-
ings can be turned into a future retirement income (i.e., transfer assets
from the present to the future). Often tax-advantaged, a variable annuity
is one of two major classes of annuities that provide insurance against
financial insecurity in retirement by pooling the assets of many savers and
then paying a lifetime or long-term income to people in the pool based
on the size of their assets and mortality expectations. The other annuity
class - the fixed annuity- also offers insurance features, but a fixed an-
nuity differs from a variable annuity in that it guarantees to preserve prin-
cipal and provide a modest return (by law, at least 90 percent of principal
plus 3 percent per annum) based on savings invested in assets such as
bonds, mortgages, and real estate held in an insurance company's gen-
eral or separate account (i.e., not marked to market).
Variable Annuities and Mutual Funds
A variable annuity is like a mutual fund in that it does not guarantee the
principal or a return. Rather it is a fund that pools individuals' savings
and gives them a variable return on those savings, depending how well
the underlying investments perform minus various management fees.
Like a mutual fund, a variable annuity enables individuals to obtain the
benefits ofa professional investment manager, who is supposed to reduce
risk and increase overall returns by spreading their savings among a vari-
ety of stocks or bonds purchased on their behalf.
But an annuity differs from a mutual fund in that it provides insurance
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Most are deferred
Deferred
Taxed
Savings
Yes, Varies
No
1.30%
None
No
No
Some
No
Rare
Must be cashed
in
ERISA agencies;
SEC
Income
ERISA agencies;
SEC; state
insur. depts.
Held inside qualified plan or IRA
Yes
0.79%
1.27%
Common
Some
Rare
Yes
Common
Yes
Taxed
Taxed
Exempt
Savings
No
No
1.30%
None
No
No
Some
No
Rare
Must be
cashed in
SECSEC; state insur.
depts.
Taxed
Deferred
Earnings taxed
Income
No
Yes
0.79%
1.27%
Common
Some
Rare
Yes
Common
Yes
Tax Status of contributions
Tax Status of accumulations
Tax Status of distributions
Major emphasis
Annual contribution limit
Availability of fixed rate fund
Investment management fees average*
Annuity/ insurance fees average*
Commissions
Actuarial & investment guarantees
Front-end or sales charges
Early withdrawal penalties
Exit penalties/ surrender charges
Can be annuitized at retirement
Regulation
Source: Lipper (1995)
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with two parts or phases. In the first, or accumulating phase (a deferred
annuity), typically, a percentage ofan employee's before-tax salary is paid
by him or her (or, on the employee'S behalf, by the employer) as a peri-
odic premium into an annuity that may offer certain guarantees, such as
a guaranteed death benefit, and impose certain restrictions, such as sur-
render charges. In the second, or retirement phase (an immediate or
payout annuity), a person uses her accumulated savings to purchase a
lifetime or long-term income through an annuity that offers a significant
additional form of insurance not found in a mutual fund, namely a way to
receive a guaranteed term or lifetime retirement income through pool-
ing the savings and the mortality risk of many retirees. An insurance
company can guarantee income to a large number ofannuity purchasers,
because some individuals die before getting back the full accumulated
value of their variable annuity investment while others live longer than
average and receive much more than the accumulated value of their
variable annuity investment. In this sense, annuities may be classified as
either group (employer-sponsored tax-qualified) or individual (individu-
ally purchased qualified or unqualified) annuities, but in practice, the
distinction between group and individual annuities isn't always clear
(Gentry and Milano 1996). Somewhat more distinct - and similar to mu-
tual funds when used as retirement vehicles - is the difference between
qualified and unqualified annuities. Qualified annuities shelter all con-
tributions and earnings from taxes until they are withdrawn. Nonquali-
fied annuities require taxes to be paid on contributions, but not on
subsequent earnings until they are withdrawn. Table 1 compares the
significant features of variable annuities and mutual funds.
Mutual funds and variable annuities are not mutually exclusive. A per-
son can invest after-tax or before-tax savings in a qualified-plan mutual
fund or accumulating annuity and then at retirement remove those sav-
ings plus the earnings in order to purchase an immediate payout annuity.
Moreover, variable annuities can be based on mutual funds; that is, vari-
able annuity savings can be invested in mutual funds and pooled along
with non-tax-deferred savings of other investors.
Growth and Size of Variable Annuities
Variable annuities are an increasingly popular retirement vehicle for
Americans. Although there is some disagreement about what proportion
of the annuity market is held in variable assets as opposed to fixed assets
(e.g., Krawcheck and Hicks 1995 vs. National Underwriter 1996), variable
annuities are now believed to be over $400 billion of the more than $650
billion in total annuity assets (National Underwriter 1996, p. 3). This com-
pares to over $4 trillion of financial assets held in public and private
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TABLE 2 Changes in the Variable Annuity Market over Time, 1975-95
Annualized
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 growth rate (%)
Variable annuity sales 5.3 17.3 51.5 28.9
(millions)
Fixed annuity sales 23.6 47.8 47.3 8
Number of companies 5 6 34 73 104
offering variable annuities
Number ofvariable annuity 5 9 47 105 244
policies
Number ofvariable annuity 14 27 198 624 2575
accounts
Source: LIMRA (1995), sales; Morningstar (1995), numbers.
pension plans in 1992 (EBRI 1995, p. 190). Variable annuity assets grew
by about 300 percent between 1990 and 1995, while the broader, more
visible mutual fund market (about $2.75 trillion at the end of 1995)
increased by about 150 percent during that time. Perhaps reflecting the
stock market runup, variable annuity purchases reached an all-time high
of$52.5 billion in 1995, up from $4.5 billion in ten years (National Under-
writer 1996, p. 14). Table 2 shows sales growth from 1985 to 1995 for
variable and fixed annuities (a portion of this reported growth may be
accounted for by rollovers from one annuity to another). Growth in non-
tax-<Jualified variable annuity sales has averaged 48.2 percent per year
since 1985, compared with 23.4 percent per year for tax-qualified variable
annuities. Flows into the mutual fund market totaled $300 billion in
1995, some of that via variable annuities using mutual funds as invest-
ment vehicles.
Growth in the institutional capacity of the variable annuity industry
also has been spectacular, as illustrated by Table 2, which shows changes
since 1975 for several indicators, including the number of variable an-
nuity companies, policies, and separate accounts. Table 3 shows the 35
largest variable annuity providers in the United States along with the
nonfixed, nonguaranteed variable annuity assets they manage. In com-
parison, the mutual fund industry has grown to over 5,000 funds (Hurley
et a!. 1995). But in the 401 (k) market, traditionally thought of as the
province of mutual funds, as much as about 40 percent of large plan
assets are held by insurance companies (Goldstein eta!. 1995). Ofcourse,
insurance companies may offer mutual funds and mutual fund com-
panies may offer or have ties to variable annuity products.
Recent analysis suggests that the investment management industry-
in particular, variable annuities and mutual funds-could experience
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TABLE 3 35 Largest Variable Annuity Providers by Assets, 1995
Rank Insurance company
1 College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF)
2 Hartford Life Insurance
3 Lincoln National Life Ins.
4 IDS Life Insurance
5 Nationawide Life Insurance
6 Allianz Life Ins of North Amer
7 Equitable Life Assur Soc of US
8 Prudential Ins ofAmerica
9 Anchor National Life Insurance
10 North American Sec Life Ins
11 Sun Life Assur of Canada (US)
12 Fidelity Investments Life Ins
13 American Skandia Life Ins
14 Merrill Lynch Life Insurance
15 Travelers Insurance
16 Variable Annuity Life Ins Co
17 Metropolitan Life Insurance
18 Guardian Insurance & Annuity
19 Aetna Life Insurance & Annuity
20 John Hancock Mutual Life Ins
21 Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins
22 Lutheran Brotherhood Var Ins Prod
23 SMA Life Insurance
24 Phoenix Horne Life Mutual Ins
25 Western Reserve Life Assur of 0 H
26 Security Benefit Life Ins
27 Life Insurance ofVirginia
28 MONYLife of America
29 Kemper Investors Life Insurance
30 Providian Life & Health Insurance
31 Fortis Benefits Insurance
32· New England Mutual Life Ins
33 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins
34 United Investors Life Ins
35 Mutual ofAmerica Life Insurance
Total for 104 companies
SlYUrce: Morningstar (1995)
Total assets in variable
annuity accounts ($ millions)
79,250.58
19,937.43
14,566.00
12,486.05
11,141.10
7,700.23
6,930.50
6,643.90
5,484.70
5,128.63
5,075.63
4,421.80
4,111.22
3,941.59
3,740.68
3,536.24
3,451.21
3,379.01
3,229.61
3,088.03
2,962.35
2,677.91
2,605.48
2,056.26
1,933.01
1,810.32
1,738.30
1,668.05
1,641.74
1,479.06
1,380.83
1,168.32
1,085.30
1,055.55
956.50
255,000.00
slower growth in the near future (Krawcheck and Hicks 1995; Hurley et
al. 1995), perhaps because the baby boom won't start entering its peak
annuity purchasing years for another ten years. If the baby boom behaves
like its predecessors, however, the long-term growth prospects for vari-
able annuities are positive.
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An Era of Individual Choice
The unique characteristics, market size, and growth in recent years of
variable annuities are alone enough to justifY a close examination of their
place within the pension system, but it is the rush toward individual
freedom and responsibility fm retirement in America that compels a
closer examination of the use of variable annuities. For example, in con-
trast to traditional defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans re-
quire a high degree of employee rather than employer responsibility.
Overall growth in employer pension plans over the past decade can be
entirely attributed to an increase in the number of defined contribution
plans that has more than offset a decline in the number ofdefined bene-
fit plans (USDOL 1996, p. 59). Some observers attribute this to changing
employer and employee preferences, while others cite contrasting legal
and regulatory treatment of defined benefit and defined contribution
plans (Warshawsky 1995; Gentry and Milano 1996). In either case, the
proportion of workers covered by some kind of defined contribution
plan has increased dramatically in the past two decades (EBRl 1994b).
Although the trend toward greater individual responsibility for retire-
ment security is clear, not all plan participants treat the attendant free-
doms similarly. Bernhein, elsewhere in this volume, has shown that indi-
viduals' financial knowledge is far from extensive. In response to a poll
(EBRl 1994a), over a third of employees say they would spend their
defined contribution accumulation or put it in a personal savings ac-
count rather than transfer it to a new plan if they changed employers.
More than halfwould do so if the sum was small or they lost theirjob.
Major U.S. national policy changes and proposals promise further to
devolve control of retirement savings into the hands of individuals. Calls
to privatize the social security system through the use of individually
directed investment accounts are growing more numerous and are at-
tracting considerable attention (SSAC 1997). Recent legislation (H.R.
3448, Small BusinessJob Protection Act of 1996) aims to protect Ameri-
cans in an era when workers can expect to change jobs during their
careers by strengthening pension portability and reducing the legal and
regulatory distinctions among types of defined contribution pensions.
The consequences of any policies that would increase individual respon-
sibility for retirement are only amplified by demographic changes that
have and will occur over the next 20 years (Biggs 1994; Shoven 1995).
At the same time, the Department of Labor has issued regulations
requiting employers to improve defined contribution pension savings
and investment education (USDOL 1995). Although Clark and Schieber
(this volume) show that education programs can affect individual pen-
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sion investment choices, it remains to be seen whether such programs
will ensure adequate retirement income in retirement for all or most
employees.
Indeed, the crucial pension policy issue most relevant to variable an-
nuities is how much of a person's retirement savings and accumulations
ultimately becomes available to support a retirement income stream.
Reductions in retirement savings for whatever reason, either through
reduced savings rates or through removing assets from retirement sav-
ings, thereby reduces the future retirement income stream and runs the
risk ofleaving a retiree with insufficient income. There have always been
opportunities for people covered by certain defined benefit and defined
contribution plans to remove retirement savings when they leave a job.
But solid statistics on the proportion of people or funds that disappear
from tax-sheltered and taxable retirement savings are hard to come by.
With changes in the tax laws in the 1980s, penalties for taking cash from
certain types of plans were increased, but as the experience of TIAA-
CREF will show, sufficient avenues remain for persistent people to get at
their retirement assets prior to retirement.
In light of these important issues, what viable experience is available
for better understanding how defined contribution pension systems do
or should work in an era of individual responsibility? Considerable atten-
tion has been paid to the savings side of the individual retirement respon-
sibility equation, but not to the income side. Recent reforms and educa-
tion campaigns have promoted incentives and education for increased
retirement savings, the power of regular investments and compounding,
time diversification, portfolio construction and allocation, and other is-
sues associated with preretirement savings and investment.
Such a focus is most appropriate when considering issues such as the
inadequate national savings rate and the long lead time needed for ac-
cumulating sufficient retirement savings under defined contribution
plans. But concerns about retirement savings need to be matched with
concerns about retirement income and other arrangements. We need to
focus on (1) savings as they affect retirement payouts and (2) retirement
income design and adequacy. In this vein, more attention should be
given to variable annuities as a model for individual retirement security
and national retirement security policy.
The rest of this chapter uses the variable annuity experience to exam-
ine the following questions:
What policies are necessary to insure adequate retirement income in a
defined contribution system?
How should Americans choose to receive retirement income?
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How can we educate Americans to make the "right" choices?
What should workers pay for management of their retirement funds,
both before and after retirement?
What is the best way to insure pension portability?
How does the variable annuity experience inform current and proposed
policy reforms that continue to shift responsibility for retirement se-
curity to individuals and their families?
This chapter addresses these questions by examining in depth the
experience with variable annuities at TIAA-CREF, the company that in-
vented the variable annuity and that is still the world's largest provider of
them.
TIAA-CREF's experience argues that national retirement security
policy-particularly policies for defined contribution pension systems
and proposals for Social Security reform-should not lose sight of the
full spectrum of the retirement life cycle: retirement income arrange-
ments as well as retirement savings and accumulations. As such, national
policy should continue to encourage and support payout annuities that
ensure an adequate income over a worker's retirement life.
Variable Annuities and TIAA-CREF
TIAA-CREF invented the modern variable annuity in 1952 and is now the
world's largest private pension and variable annuity provider. The inven-
tion of the variable annuity was the culmination of several decades of
development ofa defined contribution pension system for higher educa-
tion starting in 1905 (this history is provided in Greenough 1990). In that
year, prior to the founding of the Teachers Insurance Annuity Associa-
tion (TIAA) in 1918, Andrew Carnegie established a $15 million revolv-
ing fund (a "free pension system") that was used to provide a retirement
income for each faculty member at 96 colleges and universities. His gift
recognized that higher education had difficulty attracting and keeping
faculty with the low salaries and lack of benefits then prevailing. This
grant led to creation of the Carnegie Foundation, which, among other
responsibilities, provided faculty who attained age 65 a retirement bene-
fit of $400 plus half of the faculty member's final salary. Unfortunately,
this defined benefit plan quickly failed, because liabilities exceeded as-
sets during a period of rapid salary increases and because dle plan did
not foresee the large number of eligible faculty and their widows.
Consequently, the Carnegie Corporation sought advice on a retire-
ment system for higher education that could remain solvent. In 1917, an
independent commission called for creation of an insurance company
established under the laws of New York. In response, the nonprofit
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Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA) was
founded in 1918 with a grant of $1 million from the Carnegie Corpora-
tion; it was chartered to provide pensions to serve the education and
research communities based on a system of individual annuities invested
in fixed assets.
Other features of the system, many of which were new then but now in
widespread use, included fu1l funding, contractual rights for policy-
holders, multiple employers and portability (to allow movement by fac-
ulty among employers), fu1l and immediate vesting, no cash values,
contributions on the part of participants, and nonagency, low-cost dis-
tribution. These elements a1l0wed the company to insure pensions for
faculty for more than two decades based on fixed accumulating and
payout annuities.
What led TIAA to consider other pension options was post World
War II inflation. Before 1940, rising investment income and the increas-
ing number of new faculty f01l0wed by fa1ling prices in the 1930s a1l0wed
TIAA to provide an adequate income for its retirees. Wodd War II's
aftermath-and those of later wars, hot and cold-helped transform
inflation into a serious permanent concern. In the late 1940s, inflation
increased and coincided with a steep rise in salaries as well as the first big
wave of faculty retiremen ts. These new retirees had spent most of their
careers at lower salaries covered by TIAA fixed annuities whose invest-
ments were based primarily on corporate bonds held to maturity and real
estate. This group found that fixed retirement annuity benefits could not
keep up with rapidly rising inflation. Even benefits based on many years
of service were low. Fixed annuity rates had remained relatively high
during the Depression but had declined after the World War II, and
contributions of newly retired faculty had of course been based on many
years of low preinflation salaries. As a result, retirement benefits as a
proportion of preretirement salary dropped substantially for most faculty
in the immediate postwar period. Many colleges and universities felt
obliged to supplement fixed income annuity benefits with additional
payments.
By the early 1950s, the difficulties posed by simultaneous high infla-
tion, low interest rates, and low benefits, prompted TIAA to re-examine
the role of traditional annuities in defined contribution plans. Other
pension providers were faced with similar circumstances, but in the case
of defined benefit plans, employers rather than employees faced the
challenge of meeting the promises they'd made with eroding real assets
and revenues.
Under William C. Greenough, then TIAA vice president, the company
launched studies to discover how an annuity plan could respond more
effectively to a variety of investment and inflation conditions. By tracing
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the performance of common stocks over the previous 70 years, a TlAA
study team found the key: a completely new instrument-christened a
variable annuity -with a 100 percent equity investment base. The result-
ing separate legal, actuarial, and investment entity was called the College
Retirement Equities Fund, or CREF (Greenough 1951).
Greenough's 1951 report proposing the variable annuity sought a way
to "overcome some of the troubles inflicted by inflation" and concluded
that adding an annuity plan investing in a broad range of common stocks
over the period studied-1880 to 1950-would have provided better
returns and better purchasing power than from fixed income invest-
ments over most periods:
This economic study should result in a basic change in planning retirement
systems in the fUlure. The faclors of inflation and deflation have pretty generally
been disregarded in past planning, with unfortunate results. This study shows
that common stock would have provided better returns Ihan those available from
fixed-income investment in most periods. (Greenough 1951, p. 6)
Variable annuities are so common today that it is hard to realize that
they were a new invention in 1952. Common stock and mutual fund
ownership by individuals was not nearly as widespread as it is today, espe-
cially in the aftermath of the Depression. This may have prompted some
powerful insurance industry interests initially to oppose the concept.
Almost as important an invention as CREF itself was the education
initiative that went with it. Meetings with educational associations, col-
lege boards of trustees, college administrators, and TlAA participants,
all aided substantially in introducing and supporting the new variable
annuity.
Plan Design and Individual Choice
CREF's creation represented a truly significant expansion of investment
choice for retit-ement savers and annuitants. TlAA-CREF was the first to
offer to its plan participants the option of choosing how much of their
premiums to allocate to the fixed-annuity account and how much to the
new variable annuity. And on retirement, annuitants faced a similar
choice about what proportion of their retirement income they wished to
receive from the fixed or the variable account. Along with new choices,
retirement savers and annuitants also faced new risks, because neither
their principal nor their earnings were guaranteed in exchange for the
possibility of greater returns on equities purchased through variable
annuities.
Expansion of choice has continued in the TlAA-CREF system. Since
1988, the company introduced a number of new options for accumulat-
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ing participants and retired annuitants. On the invesunent side, colleges
and universities were given the chance to offer their employees more
options: a money market account, an account for corporate bonds, then
global, growth, and indexed equities accounts, and a social choice ac-
count. Finally, in 1995 TIAA introduced a separate account for real es-
tate. On the payout side, as new accounts were added to CREF for pre-
miums and accumulations, they were also added as options for payout
annuities as well.
Traditional Lifetime Annuity Options
To accommodate different family situations and preferences for receiv-
ing retirement income, TIAA-CREF now provides a variety of annuity
income options. Annuitants may select a one-life option, that provides to
the annuitant an income for life, or a two-life option, that provides an
income for both the primary annuitant and a second annuitant (e.g., a
spouse) for both lifetimes. Under the two-life option, there are some
additional choices. For example, upon the death of one of the annui-
tants, the annuity can be designed to pay the remaining annuitant a full
benefit or two-thirds of the original benefit. In addition, for both one-life
and two-life annuities, retirees can add to lifetime benefits a guaranteed
period (10, 15, or 20 years).
TIAA-CREF also offel-s different payment methods. Under the TIAA
standard payment method, an annuitant's first year's income is based on
a full payout dividend rate that reflects current TIAA invesunent earn-
ings (recently this has been about 7 percent). Subsequent income will
continue to reflect total TIAA earnings, that can vary from year to year
(changes in payout rates are made by the TIAA Board of Trustees). This
continues for the life of the annuity. The CREF payment method is simi-
lar, but initial annuity income is set at an assumed investment rate of 4
percent. Again, depending on invesunent performance in comparison
with the 4 percent assumed rate, subsequent income is periodically ad-
justed up or down. To supplement the CREF and TIAA standard pay-
ment methods, in 1982 the company introduced the TIAA Graded Pay-
ment Method. Under this method, annuity payments in the first year are
based on an assumed interest rate of 4 percent- higher than the TIAA
minimum 2.5 percent guarantee, but lower than the total interest rate
used for the TIAA standard method. This assumed interest rate is less
than the full anticipated rate to allow for increases in which a portion of
each year's earnings are added to the "annuity reserve" (which can be
thought of as assets) in order to purchase additional annuity income for
the following year. The remainder is paid as current income. The propor-
tional benefit increase each year is close to the difference between a 4
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percent rate and the total interest rate earned. Thus, new retirees face
a choice between higher initial income through the TIAA standard
method or a better chance at inflation protection but lower initial in-
come through CREF or the TlAA graded method.
Alternatives to Traditional Lifetime Annuities
More recently, the pension plan introduced several additional options
for obtaining retirement income and direct cash prior to or in lieu of a
lifetime or long-term payout annuity in response to changing tax and
benefit laws and to participants' expressed desires. The following alterna-
tives are governed by a wide variety of laws, regulations, institutional
rules, and TIAA-CREF policies:
Minimum distribution option (MDO). In response to 1980s legislation
that affected private sector pension accumulations and payouts, TIAA-
CREF has since 1991 offered MDO, which is a temporary or permanent
substitute for a traditional annuity that allows an individual reaching age
70'h to take a required minimum payment each year based on the size of
his or her accumulation and an actuarial calculation specified in the tax
regulations.
Transfer payout annuity (TPA). This allows an individual to transfer
funds from the fixed annuity TIAA account in equal amounts over a 10-
year period either to a CREF account, to another company's retirement
account, or directly to the individual as a cash payment.
Cash withdrawals. Subject to the employer's rules, withholding, taxes,
and, in some cases, IRS penalties, a higher education employee, after
leaving a job, may take a cash withdrawal from his or her tax-<.\eferred
group annuity account after age 591-<1. For example, a former employee
over the age of 5912 who takes a cash withdrawal will pay income taxes on
the amount in the year in which the payment is made. In contrast, if that
employee had chosen to annuitize those same funds, she would pay in-
come taxes only on the amount received each year (possibly at a lower
rate, since each yearly payment would be smaller than the full cash with-
drawal). Institutions in higher education have set a wide variety of rules
for their employees in this area, but of approximately 5,500 participating
institutions in TIAA-CREF, only about 700 prohibit any sort of cash. Even
in those cases, individuals can obtain cash from their own voluntary sup-
plemental annuities (known as SRAs or TDAs).
Transfers and rollovers. Under certain circumstances, participants may
transfer some or all of their accumulations to another retirement fund-
ing vehicle or roll their savings over to an individual retirement account
(IRA). Transfers continue to be treated as retirement funds. IRA ac-
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counts are not subject to withholding imposed on direct cash withdrawals
and can, therefore, be used in a two-step process to obtain cash.
Loans. Similarly, employees may take loans against their accumulations
in voluntary supplemental retirement annuities (SRAs). When these are
repaid, the accumulations remain available to support retirement in-
come. If these are not repaid, they are subject to penalties and taxes and,
most important, are lost from the tax-deferred retirement account.
In addition to these income and cash options, TIAA-CREF introduced
in 1996 the ability for annuitants to make postretirement transfers (no
more than once a year) among most of the CREF accounts and to TIAA,
thus enabling them to change the source of their income throughout re-
tirement. Although this is not an income option, it underscores that, to-
day, TIAA-CREF participants and retirees face a large number ofchoices
about their premium allocations, preretirement investments, annuity in-
come, and annuity investments.
Results of Individual Choice
Some ofTIAA-CREF's accumulating participants and retired annuitants
have responded to these changes by choosing one or more of the new
options for retirement savings, investment, and retirement income. We
next summarize these responses and offer suggestions about the implica-
tions of this changing behavior.
We note, however, that TIAA-CREF's participants are concentrated in
higher education and research institutions. Hence, they are not repre-
sentative of the U.S. working population, nor are they fully representative
of workers covered by pension plans. Further, these results are from the
past, not the future. Therefore, they must be taken with the appropriate
cautions before they are used to predict or even suggest how the entire
future U.S. workforce might respond to similar options that could be part
of private pension reform or social security privatization. For example,
the full-time higher education workforce is older and has a higher pro-
portion of women, than the rest of the full-time private sector U.S. work-
force. Higher education employees are more likely to work in an institu-
tion that offers a pension plan than employees in other private sectors
(94.5 percent to 71.5 percent). And they are more likely to participate in
the pension plan (by 79.8 percent to 59.1 percent, the preceding num-
bers were computed by Mark Warshawsky andJohn Ameriks 1996, from
the 1993 Current Population Survey). They also have higher working
incomes, wealth, and retirement incomes than employees in other sec-
tors. Of course, TIAA-CREF participants, by definition, have nearly 100
percent participation rates and so are even less representative of the
224 Variable Annuities In a DC Pension System
entire U.S. working population. But because of this latter difference, the
TIAA-CREF experience does show how individuals might behave as de-
fined contribution plans grow increasingly popular in the public and
private sectors or under social security-sponsored individual retirement
accounts.
Results of Individual Choice I: Retirement Savings
In defined contribution plans, retirement income depends on the
choices individuals make about allocating their premiums and their ac-
cumulations, and then how all those savings perform as assets.
Returns rm Accumulations. Overall, what is the investment experience
\vith CREF variable annuities as retirement savings vehicles? Figure I
shows that CREF Stock has outperformed inflation since 1952 by an
average of 6.5 percent per year (investment experience with other CREF
funds has been good to excellent, but they are too new to allow long-term
measurement). Although CREF and TIAA (the fixed annuity) have en-
joyed superior returns overall, both are subject to return variations. Fig-
ure I also shows that CREF stock accumulations failed to keep up with
inflation during the I 970s and early 1980s. TIAA-CREF's participants and
annuitants were directly affected: for those still saving for retirement, it
reduced for a time the expected value of future retirement income based
on pension savings and the earnings on those savings. Of course, it did
offer the advantage of some valuable dollar cost averaging, and in fact
CREF performed well in the 1980s and I990s.
Savings Allocation Decisions. How have TIAA-CREF participants allo-
cated their savings? Table 4 shows preretirement premium and savings
accumulation allocations between TIAA and CREF over the past 25 years.
Among other things, this table reflects long-term changes in the stock
and bond markets. Poor performance of the stock market in the 1970s
likely discouraged participants from holding assets or allocating pre-
miums to CREF. As interest rates moderated and the stock market per-
formed well in the 1980s, allocations to CREF began to increase.
We can also take a snapshot that shows how individual demographics
affect the allocation choices people make. Table 5 shows preretirement
saving and premium allocations for retirement plan participants by age,
income, sex, occupation, and education. (These figures are from a 3,602-
person sample ofTIAA-CREF participants in 1993; the sample has been
weighted to match key characteristics ofall TIAA-CREF participants.)
Age. As might be expected, the average size of a participant's annual
premium payments and accumulations increases with age, but the use of
the CREF fund declines with age. The proportion of premiums going to
all CREF accounts diminishes from 68 percent for those under age 35, to
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Figure 1. CREF stock and stock accumulation unit values versus inflation. Source:
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TABLE 4 Changes over Time in the Proportion of Premiums, Accumulations,
and Annuity Income and Annuity Reserves Allocated Between TIAA
and CREF, 1982-95
Accu11lulating annuities (%) Payout annuities (%)
Accumulating
Premiums annuity reserves Inc01ne Reserves
TIAA CREF TIAA CREF TIAA CREF TIAA CREF
1982 57.6 42.4 49.8 50.2 74.4 25.6 58.9 41.1
1985 60.4 39.6 48.0 52 73.2 26.8 58.1 41.9
1990 54.4 45.6 52.1 47.9 72.9 27.1 64.6 35.4
1995 39.0 61.0 42.6 57.4 70.4 29.6 58.8 41.2
Source: Author's computations using TIAA-CREF data.
47 percent among those age 65 and above. Younger participants allocate
a greater proportion of their accumulations to CREF, while older partici-
pants allocate greater percentages to TIAA.
Sex. Men's average total preretirement accumulations are more than
double women's, although women's total annual premiums are about 70
percent of men's. Both men and women allocate a markedly higher pro-
portion of their premiums and accumulations to variable annuities as
compared to fixed annuities, although men allocate somewhat more
than women to variable annuities. This difference, we believe, is a func-
tion ofaccumulation size as well as sex differences in risk aversion.
Occupation and institution type. Faculty and senior administrators
strongly prefer CREF variable annuities to TIAA fixed annuities. Al-
though their premium payments and accumulations are far lower than
faculty and administrators, professional/ technical Staff make almost
identical choices. Only clerical and maintenance staff prefer TIAA to
CREF for their basic retirement plan. Only small variations in allocations,
accumulation, and premium totals are evident by type of institution.
Household income. Total accumulations and premiums show a predict-
able increase with income, as does the preference for CREF. Although
the preference for CREF varies with income, it is nearly universal. The
only exception are households with income under $25,000, where par-
ticipants allocate about half their premiums and 53 percent of their assets
toTIAA.
Education. Total accumulations, premiums, and the use of variable an-
nuities all increase with education. More highly educated participants
allocate a greater proportion of their funds to CREF.
Although not presented in this table, neither marital statuS nor the
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TABLE 5 Percent of 1995 Accumulations and Premiums Invested by Non-Retirees in
TIAA-CREF RA/ GRA Accoun ts by Selected Demographic Characteristics,
1993 (N = 3,602)
Accumu- Accumu-
lations in lations in Average In In
Average TIAA CREF total TIAA CREF
accumulations (%) (%) premium (%) (%)
Total $115,402 44 56 $ 7,000 38 62
Age
Under 35 $ 21,004 37 63 $ 4,370 32 68
35 to 44 $ 58,671 44 56 $ 6,202 37 63
45 to 54 $147,214 45 55 $ 8,026 38 62
55 to 64 $243,255 49 51 $ 8,856 44 56
65+ $290,552 57 43 $ 9,653 53 47
Sex
Men $160.697 41 59 $ 8.277 35 65
Women $ 70.761 47 53 $ 5.742 41 59
OCClipation
Teaching Faculty $158,798 42 58 $ 8,064 37 63
Senior Admin. $156,942 43 57 $ 9,405 36 64
Prof./Technical $ 74,697 44 56 $ 6,315 37 63
Clerical Support $ 44,356 53 47 $ 3,766 46 54
Inc01lU!
Under$25K $ 21,829 53 47 $ 2,550 50 50
$25K-$34K $ 28,285 45 55 S 3,898 41 59
$35K-$49K $ 62,864 46 54 $ 5,073 39 61
$50K-$74K $102,541 44 56 $ 6,285 39 61
$75K-$99K $147,784 42 58 $ 8,088 35 65
$lOOK+ $224.514 40 60 $11,699 34 66
Risk tolerance
Substantial risk $ 89,011 25 74 $ 6,276 20 80
Above average $106,975 35 65 $ 7,171 28 72
Risk
Average $125,623 49 51 $ 7,034 44 56
Below average $119,775 62 38 $ 7,018 58 42
SOUTU: Author's computations usingTIAA-CREF data.
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presence of children seems to be associated with differences in allocation
percen tages.
This table is drawn from data on participants in the basic retirement
plans at TIAA-CREF. Many participants also have the option of starting
and maintaining a separate voluntary supplemental retirement annuity
(SRA or a "tax-deferred annuity"), which is a voluntary salary reduction
plan that uses the participant's before-tax dollars (subject to a $9,500 per
year limit or less, depending on other defined contribution plan usage).
We combined the data from the 1993 survey with SRA data information,
and detect variations in allocations similar to those for the basic retire-
ment plan. However, for almost every variable, participants allocate more
of their premiums and accumulations to CREF as opposed to TIAA.
Allocations to CREF range from about 60 percent to about 75 percent.
One hypothesis is that participants are more risk tolerant with their vol-
untary tax-deferred accounts than with their basic retirement accounts.
Retirement and Financial Education. Other than demographics, what
might affect allocation decisions? At least one attitudinal characteristic
does seem to affect behavior: participants' willingness to take on invest-
ment risk. Table 5 shows that participants willing to take on substantial
risk (i.e., participants who are relatively risk tolerant) allocate over 80
percent oftheir premiums and over 70 percent of their accumulations to
CREF, while those who are most conservative in their approach to risk
allocate about 60 percent of their premiums and accumulations to TIAA.
In turn, risk tolerance may be affected by education, both by general
education levels and by specific education about finance and retirement.
It is likely that education about savings, risk, return, retirement annuities,
and related concerns can help individuals make choices appropriate to
their changing circumstances. The company has a long-standing commit-
ment to and has made significant investments in participant education
through brochures, books, seminars, individual counseling, sponsorship
of financial programs on television and radio, retirement planning soft-
ware, specific illustrations of retirement income for individuals, and
other means. Although the exact effects of these programs are hard to
measure, the company is known as a leader in retirement planning
education.
A~ an example, TIAA-CREF suggests in its literature that many, if not
most people will be able to balance risk and return by allocating half of
their premiums to TIAA fixed funds and half to the CREF variable an-
nuity funds. While participants do not, in the aggregate, allocate 50 per-
cent of their premiums to CREF, they do tend to behave as one might
predict. That is, younger, more highly compensated and educated risk
takers, are more likely to allocate premiums and assets to CREF, while
their opposites are more likely to put their funds into the fixed account.
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Such a result suggests that, with substantial retirement-awareness educa-
tion, people roughly follow the pattern that many financial planners
think they should: allocate a greatel- proportion of retirement savings to
higher-risk, higher-return stocks when younger and reduce those alloca-
tions with time. The one discordant note here is that lower-income and
clerical/ support staff allocate less of their premiums and accumulations
to CREF than any other group.
Of course, it is difficult to draw a causal connection from this data,
since these demographic variables are likely to be highly correlated and it
is unclear how much of the variation we see is due to age versus cohort
effects. The next step in this research will be to assess the relative contri-
bution of each factor to allocation decisions. Another step should be to
track more precisely the effects of demographic variables and risk toler-
ance over time.
Results of Individual Choice II: Retirement Income
A key question driving pension and social security policy is whether
workers will be able to meet their retirement income goals, which could
be defined as total retirement income that lasts as long as needed, that
provides for a spouse or other beneficiaries in case the retiree dies first,
and that is adequate in amount. In practice, a combination of an em-
ployer pension, social security benefits, and personal savings should en-
able a retiree to (1) provide income for the retiree's remaining lifetime,
(2) have provisions for covering a beneficiary, and (3) replace an ade-
quate portion of preretirement income.
Traditional lifetime annuity choices. While TlAA-CREF participants have
traditionally chosen lifetime annuities when they retire, since 1990, some
participants have elected to take advantage ofother income options, such
as minimum distribution, systematic withdrawals, IRA rollovers, and lump
sum withdrawals. Although starting an annuity doesn't necessarily equal
retirement, we know when TIAA-CREF participants choose to begin re-
tirement annuities. Figure 2 and Table 6 show changes in TIAA-CREF
annuity starting ages for both men and women over time. Reflecting
general shifts in the U.S. economy and specific changes in laws affecting
retirement, first-time annuitants have bifurcated: more are now older and
younger than age 65. In 1979, nearly 42 percent of new annuitants were
age 65, while in 1994 about 21 percent of new annuitants were age 65.
However, since peaking at 18.8 percent in 1991, the proportion ofpartici-
pants age 70 and over starting payout annuities dropped to 14.8 percent
in 1994 (due to the availability of the minimum distribution option, as
described below). Although not required by law, two-life annuities have
become more popular among all age groups since 1978. The popularity
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Figure 2. TIAA-CREF annuity income starting ages. Source: Authors' computations using TIAA-CREF data.
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TABLE 6 Selection of One-Life and Two-Life Annuity Income Options by Age at
Retirement
Male primary
annuitants (%)
Female primary
annuitants (%)
One-life Two-lifeAge annuity started
1978
1983
1986
1990
1994
One-life Two-life
43.5 56.5
36.8 63.2
27.8 72.2
25.6 74.4
26.0 74.0
81.1
73.1
69.2
66.0
67.8
18.9
26.9
30.8
34.0
32.2
Source: Author's computations using TlAA-CREF data.
of one-life annuities has declined, but they remain relatively popular
among younger male retirees. Women are more likely than men to
choose one-life annuities at all ages. In addition, there is a wealth effect in
annuity choice: annuitants with larger total accumulations are more likely
to select two-life annuities than those with smaller totals.
New Income and Cash Options. Finally, and most important, significant
changes have occurred in participants' preference for nontraditional
income options. Recalling that the percentage of participants starting
one-life or two-life annuities dropped between 1991 and 1994, Table 7
combines for those years the numbers ofTIAA and CREF life annuity and
minimum distribution option (MDO) contracts issued. MDO contracts
were first offered in 1991 as an alternative way of dealing with federal
requirements that participants reaching age 70\-'2 begin to take a mini-
mum distribution. Since then, MDOs have grown from 2.2 percent of
total TIAA income contracts issued to 17.3 percent in 1994, while CREF
MDOs have increased from 3.4 percent of all contracts in 1991 to 21.2
percent in 1994. Total MDOs increased by 49 percent from 1993 to 1994.
MDOs issued where no other premiums are being paid under the em-
ployer plan - a presumption that the recipient is truly retired or is now
working at a non-TIAA-CREF employer- totaled 12.2 percent of TIAA
contracts and 15 percent ofCREF contracts issued in 1994 (King 1996).
Even for those taking traditional income options, the use of the
TIAA graded method and CREF have both increased at the expense of
the TIAA standard payout method. A separate analysis reveals that this
change may reflect an interest in inflation protection and the ability of
people with larger accumulations to take a reduction of income in the
short run in exchange for an increase in income later on.
Similarly, the use of transfer payout annuities (TPAs) has increased
rapidly since their introduction in 1991. This is a popular vehicle for
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TABLE 7 TIAA and CREF Life Annuity and Minimum Distribution Contracts Issued II!!:
1990 1993 1994 II1991 1992 ~
Type ofcontract Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent :I5.
TlAA (total) 20,400 21,558 22,197 20,860 21,296 e.II
..
Standard 93.4 90.7 82.4 78.4 70.9 S'
Graded 6.6 7.1 8.8 9.7 1I.7 II
Minimum distribution - 2.2 8.8 12.0 17.3 cn
"D
CREF (total) 8,877 9,801 11,538 12,073 13,616 II:I
..Stock 93.6 89.2 81.2 76.8 67.6 0'
Money market 6.4 7.0 5.3 4.4 3.7 :I
...
Social choice - 0.3 0.9 1.9 1.9 ~
Global - <0.1 1.5 5.2 ..II
Growth
- - - -
0.3 a
Equity index - - 0.1
Minimum distribution! - 3.4 12.2 15.3 21.2
Source: Author's computations using TlAA-CREF data.
Nole: Except for payment" under the Minimum Distribution Option, all contracts are for Immediate Life Annuities.
"'Percentages in the Minimum Distribution subgroups may not add to totals because of rounding.
!lncludes Minimum Distributions from all types ofCREF accounts.
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moving accumulation from TIAA to CREF over a ten-year period. TPAs
also allow individuals to receive payments directly or to transfer funds to
another pension provider. In 1994, about 13 percent ofTPAswere used
to transfer accumulations to another pension provider, 16 percent took
direct cash payments, and the rest transferred to a CREFvariable annuity
account. Since only 2 percent of all 1994 TPA cash participants also
settled a portion of their accumulations as life annuities, taking cash
through this method seems to be, in most cases, an alternative to a tradi-
tional annuity.
In the 1990s, TIAA-CREF's participating institutions have been al-
lowed to offer participants the option of removing funds from accumulat-
ing (preretirement) contracts. Overall, approximately 80 percent of
institutions allow individuals to withdraw all accumulations after termi-
nating employment, while another 5 percent allow partial withdrawals. In
addition, within legal, institutional, and TIAA-CREF guidelines, individ-
uals at most institutions may receive funds from CREF accounts by trans-
ferring them to another carrier's retirement plan or by rolling them over
to an IRA (since 1991). Finally, participants may take a direct cash with-
drawal from an SRA (beginning in 1990 for people no longer working at
the college concerned and in 1993 for some people still working). Cash
withdrawals and some IRA rollovers (which then allow individuals to take
cash without the withholding penalty) represent funds being removed
from retirement savings, thus diminishing the amount of money avail-
able to support a participant's retirement annuity. As with MDOs and
TPAs, the use of these options has increased in the past few years.
In sum, TIAA-CREF has traditionally offered and encouraged its par-
ticipants to take lifetime payout annuities. The growing popularity of
two-life annuities supports the goal of spousal coverage and the growing
popularity of the TIAA graded method supports the goal of inflation
protection. However, as nonlife time annuity options have become avail-
able, there has been a rapid increase in their use. This trend suggests, at
least in the short run, that a proportion of participants are interested in
removing cash from their tax-deferred savings prior to retirement and in
receiving income that is not guaranteed for life after retirement. Offset-
ting this, as we will see below, are increases in the average accumulation
size, which may allow some individuals to take cash and still replace a
significant portion of their preretirement income through traditional
annuities.
Through new non-traditional income and lump sum options, tradi-
tional annuities could begin to be affected by adverse selection. War-
shawsky and Friedman (1990) have shown that adverse selection does
playa role in the choices individuals make. Depending on the flexibility
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offered in a retirement plan - that is, opportunities for exercising ad-
verse selection -it could affect the entire pool of annuitants. With its
large pool of 1.8 million participants and annuitants, TIAA-CREF's tradi-
tional annuities have not been affected by new options. However, the
design of pension reforms, including private pension systems as well as
possible social security privatization, will need to confront demands by
participants for flexibility in income and cash options (Mitchell and
Zeldes 1996).
TIAA-CREF retirement income experience. Although TIAA-CREF variable
annuities have for most periods performed well, payments have varied
along with market performance. For example, prior to the 1970s and
again in the 1980s, people did very well with accumulating and payout
annuities based on CREF. But as Figure 1 shows, CREF annuity income
rates dropped seven times between 1972 and 1982. Since that time, CREF
annuity income rates have risen substantially and, over the long haul,
have provided a good, ifvariable source of income for retirees depending
on their savings rate and the length of time they were able to accumulate
assets. Thus, participants and annuitants who I'ely on variable annuities
are not immune from ups and downs in the real value of their portfolios.
Other things being equal, initial annuity-based retirement income can
be a good predictor of later retirement income. Figure 3 shows, for new
annuitants, the average annualized initial annuity payments for TIAA,
CREF, and the total for TIAA and CREF for each year from 1980 to 1994.
The average total initial payment has increased by 10.9 percent per year,
well ahead of inflation over that time. For 1992-1994, however, the in-
crease is only 2.6 percent per year; this reflects increased use of CREF
annuities and the TIAA graded method, which use an initial interest rate
assumption of 4 percent (lower than the TIAA standard method initial
interest rate for the same period). For example, the proportion of new
annuitants selecting the TIAA graded method or CREF variable annu-
ities increased from 45 percent in 1990 to nearly 60 percent in 1994.
Figure 4 further shows the relationship between size ofaccumulation and
preference for CREF payout annuities in 1994. As size of accumulation
rises, so does the preference for CREF payout annuities and the TIAA
graded method.
Initial and subsequent retirement income also depends on the size
of accumulation at retirement, as well as subsequent earnings on that
income. Based on a survey of TIAA-CREF retirees, Table 8 provides a
snapshot for 1993 of retirees' annualized annuity income (payments
were annualized for those individuals who started a payout annuity dur-
ing 1993) and "average payout reserves" (i.e., a present value, actuarial
calculation that is the functional equivalent of remaining assets or ac-
cumulations). These numbers do not indicate what proportion of pre-
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TABLE 8 Estimated Annualized Annuity Payouts and Total Reserves from TIAA and CREF
Accounts by Selected Demographic Characteristics, 1993
% %
Average % Average % Average Average Average
annualized annualized annualized Average TIAA CREF
annuity TIAA CREF payout payout payout
payments payments payments reserves reserves reserves
Total $11,677 66.9 33.1 $114,029 58.7 41.3
Age
Under 65 $10,733 76 24 $125,237 68.3 31.7
65 to 70 $11,703 74.5 25.5 $127,262 65.1 34.9
71 to 75 $14,071 72.5 27.5 $136,258 63.4 36.6
76+ $10,103 50.3 49.6 $ 82,138 39.4 60.6
Sex
Men $15,186 $152,459
Women $ 7,976 $ 73,487
Education
Some College $ 5,751 $ 53,833
College Graduate $ 9,736 $ 98,712
Post Grad Work $11,392 $111,415
Masters Degree $10,294 $ 98,609
Doctorate $16,893 $169,432
Professional $22,503 $229,601
Total household income/annuity payments as of % ofTotal Income
Under $25K $ 4,219 ~18% $ 36,840
$25K-$34K $ 7,262 21-29% $ 67,876
$35K-$49K $10,773 22-31% $106,137
$50K-$74K $14,740 20-29% $148,198
$75K-$99K $20,318 21-27% $207,651
$100K + $25,770 :526% $250,284
SouTce: Author's computations using TIAA-CREF data.
retirement income is being replaced, but annualized TIAA-CREF income
is seen to represent only about 20 to 30 percent of total reported house-
hold income in 1993, for nearly all income groups. We speculate that
social security income represents a substantial proportion of the remain-
ing income for lower-income annuitants, while other income sources-
earned income, other private pensions, and personal savings-contrib-
ute to the total for higher-income annuitants.
Annuity income for these retirees is split about two-thirds to one-third
between TIAA and CREF annuities, and the split varies little by demo-
graphic characteristics. The exception seems to be people aged 76 and
238 Variable Annuities In a DC Pension System
TABLE 9 Average Household Wealth Held in Tax-Deferred Accounts Among Retired
TIAA-CREF Annuitants, 1995
Owned
Ifowned, assets held in . . .
Stock Fixed-income Cash
Total
invested
401 (k) salary reduction plan
TIAA-CREF individual annuities
403(b) salary reduction plan
Other thrift savings plans
Individual retirement account
Other tax-deferred annuities
KEOGH account
Average, all respondents
Average, all respondents (non-
TIAA-CREF)
(n=28)
(n=477)
(n=31)
(n =58)
(n=319)
(n= 162)
(n= 18)
47%
36%
38%
58%
56%
22%
49%
47%
63%
61%
25%
22%
48%
29%
7%
1%
1%
22%
22%
30%
22%
$155,661
$132,763
$86,441
$75,258
$72,231
$67,091
$52,017
$100,254
$75,081
,Sin..",,: Author's computations using TIAA-GREF data,
Noles: Number of persons reporting any amount in parentheses. Persons reporting a total amount
for an account type but reporting no amount for an asset class within the account are assumed to
hold SO in that asset class for purposes of calculating above averages. Totals are averages over
account types within each asset class. weighted by the number of persons reporting a LOtal for each
account type.
older who derive a larger proportion of their income from CREF annuity
contracts (of course, annuitants whose responses are reflected in this
table could choose how to allocate their retirement reserves only at the
time a payout annuity was established), The overall conclusion is that
annuitants tend to diversity risk. Based on other data, nearly 95 percent
of CREF stock participants chose to balance the volatility of the variable
annuity by electing the fixed annuity (TIAA) as part of their retirement
portfolio, while nearly 54 percent of TIAA participants choose to diver-
sity into CREF.
Annuitants may also diversity their other retirement assets. Prelimi-
nary responses to a November 1995 survey of the assets reported by 487
retired annuitants show that reported assets held in TIAA and CREF
appear roughly comparable to the average totals and percentages as mea-
sured by company records. However, as Mitchell (1988) has shown else-
where, self-reports on retirement plans can be inaccurate. In any event,
the TIAA annuitants report total household assets of$581 ,355, including
$200,000 in real estate holdings, and net worth of $555,213, Turning to
retirement-related assets, Table 9 provides average household wealth re-
ported by these respondents for a range oftax-deferred accounts, includ-
ing TIAA-CREF. The number of individuals reporting that they hold an
asset is given in parentheses. One interesting result is that although their
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TIAA and CREF assets are split two-thirds to one-third in favor of fixed
annuities, respondents report that they hold a greater proportion of
their other retirement wealth in variable (e.g., stock) funds. The survey
also shows that 47 percent of these same respondents hold stocks and 47
percent (not necessarily the same people) hold stock mutual funds, while
30 percent hold bond mutual funds and 80 percent hold corporate
bonds. In addition, about a third of the annuitants surveyed say they are
covered by a defined benefit plan and 17 percent report that their spouse
is likewise covered. Aside from employer plans, individual retirement
accounts are the most popular form of personal retirement savings. Sixty-
five percent of annuitant households surveyed list IRA assets. Unfortu-
nately, we do not yet know whether people who hold one kind ofasset are
more or less likely to hold another kind ofasset. Still, it is likely that these
annuitants diversify their retirement assets as well as other assets they
hold.
Other data show that there are distinct differences between male and
female annuity income-related behavior, but this is mainly due to differ-
ences in time spent in the accumulation phase. In 1994, males in our
sample used on average over $200,000 to purchase payout annuities, over
twice as much as women that year. Females comprised over 40 percent of
the total population who annuitized in 1994, but they represented less
than 10 percent of those who annuitized an amoun t over $500,000. These
proportions have remained roughly the same (in real terms) since the
early 1980s.
Size of accumulation depends most on length oftime spent in the our
pension system. Women spend less time (17 years on average) in the
accumulation phase than men (23 years). Thus, male annuitants are
likely to have higher accumulations, even in those cases where salary
histories are comparable. Table 10 shows the distribution of new annui-
tants in 1994 according to time in the TIAA-CREF system. Women are far
more likely than men (44.5 percent to 25 percent) to have been in system
15 years or less when they start an annuity. In recent years, however, the
proportion of females starting new annuity contracts has increased, and
there is some evidence that they remaining in the system longer than they
did previously. Thus, the male-female split in annuity payouts may begin
to migrate toward equality in the future. The lesson is that in a defined
contribution, variable annuity setting, time spent in the accumulation
phase is crucial to income adequacy. Factors affecting time spent ac-
cumulating include the age at which a person begins accumulating sav-
ings, the age of retirement, and the time during which retirement saving
is suspended (e.g., sabbatical, unemployment or employment outside of
a pension plan, family obligations, etc).
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TABLE 10 Distribution of TlAA-CREF Annuitants by Years in TlAA-CREF Systems-
19941ssues
Male annuitants Female annuitants All annuitants
Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
Years in Percent of percent of Percent of percent of Percent of percent of
system annuitants annuitants annuitants annuitants annuitants annuitants
0-5 5.07 5.07 6.97 6.97 5.84 5.84
6-10 9.72 14.79 16.82 23.79 12.59 18.43
11-15 10.31 25.10 20.71 44.50 14.52 32.95
16-20 11.98 37.08 22.70 67.20 16.32 49.27
21-25 18.52 55.60 17.90 85.10 18.27 67.54
26-30 21.39 76.99 9.12 94.22 16.42 83.96
31-35 14.64 91.63 3.96 98.18 10.32 94.28
36-40 6.72 98.35 1.39 99.57 4.56 98.84
41-45 1.53 99.88 0.40 99.97 1.07 99.91
46-50 0.12 100.00 0.03 100.00 0.09 100.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Author's computations using TIAA-CREF data.
Costs
In addition to individual behavior and annuities, a issue critical to the
retirement adequacy question is how much it costs individuals for pen-
sion asset management. This is especially important because even rela-
tively small charges have a significant effect on accumulations. For exam-
ple, over a 30-year accumulation period, an individual could invest $100
per month in an account with an annual expense fee of .35 percent,
and the same amount in an account with a 1 percent annual expense
charge-with both funds earning the same 10 percent per annum. The
account with the lower expense fee would yield $22,852 more.
Variable annuities are expensive when compared with mutual funds,
but they do offer additional products and services, so, direct cost com-
parisons must be made carefully. Table 11 shows average annual expense
charges for variable annuity accounts and mutual funds. A small number
of variable annuity accounts have no surrender charge and a few have a
front end load. About a third of mutual funds have a front or back end
load. Even so, the basic investment management fees for mutual funds
and variable annuities are similar. But the extra insurance feature makes
annuity product fees average more than double those for mutual fund
products. Variable annuities include insurance for the risk of providing
lifetime income (i.e., in managing a population of annuitants, there is
unpredictability associated with future mortality). Some variable an-
nuities also guarantee principal and offer other features. But the most
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TABLE 11 Average Expenses for Variable Annuities and Comparable Mutual
Funds by Objective, 1996 (does not include sales charges, withdrawal
charges, or annual contract charges)
Variable annuities Mutual funds eREF
Total
Fund insurance Total Total Total
expense expense expenses expense expense
Equity index 0.53 .30
Growth 0.82 1.25 2.07 1.13 .37
Growth and income 0.64 1.26 1.91 0.97 .32
International stock 1.10 1.26 2.35 1.56* .40
Balanced 0.79 1.26 2.06 1.08 .31
Corporate bond 0.68 1.24 1.92 0.93 .29
Money market 0.51 1.26 1.78 0.65 .29
Averaget 0.79 1.27 2.06 1.06: .33
Sauree: Morningstar (1996) Lipper (1996)
*Global Funds
tAverage includes types of funds not shown
lExcluding Equity Index
interesting issue is that the fee variation among variable annuities is far
greater than the variation between variable annuities and mutual funds;
thus, variable annuity expense rates range from 0.29 percent to 3.43
percent per year. Some annuity issuers are able to charge rates that are
less than a tenth of the most expensive rates. Variable annuities would be
very attractive as vehicles for social security individual accounts, if they
were to be managedforfees at the low end ofscale. At the high end of the
scale, savers would experience considerable erosion of earnings.
How is possible to manage variable annuities with a cost structure near
the bottom of the scale, even below average mutual fund fees, like TIAA-
CREF does? Table 11 shows total expenses for the CREF variable annuity
accounts, and, CREF account expenses also compare favorably with mu-
tual fund expenses. This is probably because CREF funds are internally
managed, are committed to low sales and marketing costs (such as low
advertising costs and the absence ofa sales force with commissions), have
economies of scale in investment management, enjoy nonprofit status,
and avoid some of the insurance charges associated with other variable
annuities.
Variable Annuities as Part of the TIAA-CREF System
Variable annuities, the CREF side ofTIAA-CREF, are now the largest part
of the nation's largest private retirement system. Experience shows that
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TIAA-CREF participants face a large number of choices about whether
and how to use variable annuities for savings and income. Currently, the
range of choices could be seen as confusing or even overwhelming, but,
in general, individuals seem to have made sensible choices within the
limits imposed by law, employers, and the plan structure itself.
This conclusion should be tempered in two ways. First, as alternatives
to traditional annuities and annuitization have appeared, people have
begun to take advantage of opportunities to take money out of TIAA-
CREF's retirement system. Some portion of this money is being used for
current consumption or in lieu of a lifetime annuity. Second, since most
of the increase in options for investment choice and for taking nonan-
nuity funds has appeared within the last 10 years or less, it is too early to
tell how these new options will affect retirement income adequacy several
decades from now.
Implications for Pension Policy
This chapter began with a set of questions about variable annuities and
how experience with them might inform private pension policy. Among
other things, the recent pension simplification bill extends the use of
defined contribution pension savings to nonprofit organizations and
small employers. It also limits requirements that older workers begin to
draw down their retirement savings at age 70, and it encourages pension
portability for workers who change jobs.
But like most of the public attention paid to pensions in recent years, it
focuses primarily on the savings side of the pension equation. Conse-
quently, despite the growing popularity of variable annuities, many peo-
ple in defined contribution pension plans receive little encouragement
and education regarding retirement income options. The questions ad-
dressed in this chapter argue for an additional pension policy focus on
the retirement income side of the equation. Specifically, public policy
should encourage annuitization as a mechanism for receiving retirement
income as an important component of the shift toward individual re-
sponsibility for retirement. At the very least, this will help avoid the im-
pact of mortality illusion - that is, an increasing number of people outliv-
ing their retirement savings. With support for annuitization, variable
annuities can be a powerful means of linking retirement security and
individual choice.
Can defined contribution pension plans replace the insurance component of
defined benefit pension plans? There is an inherent tradeoff between the
built-in insurance component of defined benefit pension plans, where
the employer bears much of the risk of providing adequate retirement
income, and the freedom of choice associated with many defined contri-
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bution pension plans where the individual bears these risks. On the one
hand, defined benefit plans reduce participants' exposure to market risk,
investment risk, inflation risk, mortality risk, and other risks. On the
other hand, defined contribution plans offer the opportunity to obtain
higher returns associated with equity investment, and they avoid the
larger and longer-term risk that individual companies might devalue or
not honor their promises.
Variable annuities are designed to provide many of the insurance guar-
antees promised by defined benefit plans, while retaining individual
choice about investments. Variable annuities can be purchased that pro-
tect against risks such as mortality and loss of principal. Few variable an-
nuities currently provide inflation protection as currently designed. Most
of all, variable annuities can be designed to provide guaranteed lifetime
or term income and are thus superior to mutual funds in these respects.
What should workers pay for management of their retirement funds, both before
and after retirement? The biggest drawback to variable annuities is their
cost, which averages twice that of the typical mutual fund. However, the
lowest-cost variable annuities (e.g., TIAA-CREF) and mutual funds (e.g.,
Vanguard) are about a third of the average cost of mutual funds, mainly
because of low marketing and sales expenses. If other providers can find
ways to limit such expenses, variable annuities could become an even
more attractive vehicle for retirement savings and income. Unfortu-
nately, the difficulty for some providers may be constitutional: reliance
on a sales force structure that builds costly commissions into expense
charges.
What policies are necessary to ensure adequate retirement income in a defined
contribution system?Ifadequacy is defined as a lifetime retirement income
that replaces a significant proportion of preretirement income, then the
TIAA-CREF experience illustrates the importance of variable annuities
in assuring adequacy. Aided by pension law, TIAA-CREF actively encour-
ages employers and employees to save regularly and steadily, to invest
those savings in well-managed, low-cost funds, and then to purchase re-
tirement annuities that guarantee lifetime income. On the other hand,
some people will opt out of a lifetime or even a long-term retirement
income in favor of cash if given the chance. Since few people have good
information about their own mortality, some will live longer than their
assets and thus could become a burden on the rest of society. Although
an economic analysis of the costs and benefits to society of allowing
relatively easy access to retirement cash is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter, there is a need for policy-oriented analysis and discussion that focuses
on the retirement income side of the pension equation, not just on the
savings side. Future pension policy should go beyond concerns such as
adequate savings, nondiscrimination, portability, and investment issues,
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in order to address the need for lifetime income, availability of annuities
and their design, limits on removing funds from retirement accounts
prior to annuitization, limits on retirement income options other than
lifetime annuities. and retirement savings, investment, payout income
education, and cost contro\.
How should Ame1icans choose to receive retirement income?An era of individ-
ual responsibility for retirement is just that: Americans are increasingly
on their own, rather than dependent on an employer or- if Social Se-
curity is privatized-on the federal government, to ensure an adequate
retirement income for life. The TIAA-CREF experience suggests that it
is possible to design a private retirement system that permits individ-
ual choice, when the choices include a range of savings vehicles, well-
managed funds, and sensible retirement income options. But we also
have argued that much education is needed to support annuitization,
and adverse selection probably raises the cost of privately purchased
annuities.
How can we educate Ame1icans to make the "'right" choices?The U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor has actively encouraged employers to increase the level
and amount of pension and investment education provided to defined
contribution pension participants. Here, too, the emphasis has been on
adequate savings and the risks and returns on investment choices. TIAA-
CREF's experience shows that education works, at least for most people,
regarding the retirement payout side as well as the savings side. Payout
issues must be central to any pension reform program involving in-
creased individual responsibility.
What is the best way to insure that retirement accounts are portable? American
workers today perceive that job changes may be more likely than in the
past, so pension portability is a way to accommodate these changing
realities and perceptions. TIAA-CREF pioneered pension portability and
has been able to adapt it to changing circumstances, including the pres-
ence of other carriers in its market.
Conclusion
The current trend to allow Americans to remove funds from their private
pensions for important purposes (housing, college, or hardships) under-
mines pension plans' ability to provide adequate retirement income.
Even more important, proposals to reform the social security program to
replace part of the current defined benefit system with a system of indi-
vidual investment accounts exposes participants to a host of new risks.
For instance, to ask all Americans to bear investment and market risks
and then be willing to live with the results is unrealistic. The few or many
who suffer under this system will undoubtedly attract considerable sym-
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pathy when markets experience a downturn. Even more, should we sup-
port pension reforms that make it likely some will suffer the conse-
quences of their actions? There is no solution that allows for complete
freedom, but that ensures complete protection. The appropriate balance
may be to encourage education and wise choice prior to retirement, and
to provide strong mechanisms, such as annuitization, for ensuring con-
tinuing retirement income when individuals are less likely to have the
financial flexibility to make up for income. Future pension reform must
give atten tion to the sorts of risks, individual behaviors, and protection
policies that have been confronted in the TIAA-CREF experience.
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ments, includingJohn Ameriks, Richard Eggers, Michael Heller, Francis
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